Basel III Liquidity Risk Measures and Bank Failure. Faculty of Commerce & Administration, North- West University (Mafikeng), Private Bag x. Mmabatho 2. 73. 5, South Africa. Copyright . This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Basel III banking regulation emphasizes the use of liquidity coverage and nett stable funding. In this paper, we approximate these measures by using global liquidity data for 3. LIBOR- based, Basel II compliant banks in 3. In particular, we compare the risk sensitivity of the aforementioned Basel III liquidity risk measures to those of traditional measures such as the nonperforming assets ratio, return- on- assets, LIBOR- OISS, Basel II Tier 1 capital ratio, government securities. Furthermore, we use a discrete- time hazard model to study bank failure. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington DC. The Federal Reserve's lending programs potentially expose the Federal Reserve. Liquidity risk is a financial risk that for a certain period of time at a given financial asset, security or commodity cannot be traded quickly enough in the market. Risk management in Indian banks is a relatively newer practice, but has already shown to increase efficiency in governing of these banks as such procedures tend to. Policy Letters Liquidity Risk Management SR 16-3 Interagency Guidance on Funds Transfer Pricing Related to Funding and Contingent Liquidity Risks. Highlights: Recent turmoil in the financial markets emphasizes the importance of effective liquidity risk management for the safety and soundness of financial. A Stress Testing Framework for Liquidity Risk One of the most important lessons learned from the recent financial crisis is that liquidity risk is. In this regard, we find that Basel III risk measures have limited ability to predict bank failure when compared with their traditional counterparts. An important result is that a higher liquidity coverage ratio is associated with a higher bank failure rate. We also find that market- wide liquidity risk (proxied by LIBOR- OISS) was the major predictor of bank failures. In particular, our contribution is the first to achieve these results on a global scale over. Introduction Liquidity describes a bank. The role of banks in the maturity transformation of short- term deposits into long- term loans makes them vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an idiosyncratic and market- wide nature (see, for instance, . The financial crisis that began in mid- 2. Prior to the turmoil, financial markets were buoyant and funding was readily available at low cost.
Standard Bank Group risk management report for the six months ended June 2010 Risk management Islamic financial services board guiding principles of risk management for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering only islamic financial services. The subsequent reversal in market conditions leads to the evaporation of liquidity with the accompanying illiquidity lasting for an extended period of time. The banking system came under severe stress, which necessitated central bank support for both the functioning of money markets and individual institutions (see . More specifically, Basel III was touted as a regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing (see, for instance, . In essence, Basel III builds on Basel I and Basel II and is intended to improve the banking sector. This is intended to reduce the risk of spill- over from the financial sector to the real economy (see, . Another objective of Basel III regulation is to increase the quantity as well as the quality of capital, with adequate capital charges needed in the trading book. Also, the regulation aims to enhance risk management and disclosure, introduce a leverage ratio to supplement risk weighted measures, and address counter- party risk posed by over- the- counter (OTC) derivatives (see, for instance, . The LCR imposes a requirement that banks maintain an adequate level of . It will, however, be highlighted in subsequent sections of the paper that the two new Basel liquidity standards will probably not achieve their desired objectives where such standards are not coupled with other risk measures and leverage ratios (see, for instance, . To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies have attempted to calculate the LCR and NSFR using global public banking data. This contribution also considers traditional liquidity risk measures such as the nonperforming assets ratio (NPAR), return- on- assets (ROA), London Interbank Offered Rate- Overnight Indexed Swap Spread (LIBOR- OISS), Basel II Tier 1 capital ratio (BIIT1. KR), government securities ratio (GSR), and brokered deposits ratio (BDR). Furthermore, we note that the traditional liquidity risk measures for asset liquidity include the GSR and LCR while funding stability is measured by the BDR and NSFR. NPAR (known as the Texas ratio under certain circumstances) exhibits robust bank failure predictive power (see . ROA relates to a bank. A positive correlation exists between ROA and bank liquidity (see, for instance, . LIBOR is the rate at which banks indicate that they are willing to lend to other banks for a specified term of the loan. The OIS rate is the rate on a derivative contract on the overnight rate. In the US, the overnight rate is the effective federal funds rate. In such a contract, two parties agree that one will pay the other a rate of interest that is the difference between the term OIS rate and the geometric average the overnight federal funds rate over the term of the contract. The OIS rate is a measure of the market. There is very little default risk in the OIS market because there is no exchange of principal; funds are exchanged only at the maturity of the contract, when one party pays the nett interest obligation to the other. The LIBOR- OISS is assumed to be a measure of bank health because it reflects what banks believe is the risk of default associated with lending to other banks. It is a measure of market- wide liquidity risk. The capital adequacy ratio BIIT1. KR is described in . Theoretical Perspectives on Basel III Liquidity Risk Measures. The difficulties experienced by some banks during the financial crisis. In response, as the foundation of its liquidity framework, the BCBS in 2. These principles provide detailed guidance on the management and supervision of liquidity risk and is intended to promote improved liquidity risk management in the case of full implementation by banks and supervisors. As such, the BCBS coordinates follow- ups by supervisors to ensure that banks adhere to . To complement these principles, the BCBS has further strengthened its liquidity framework by developing two minimum standards for funding liquidity. They are described in the ensuing discussions (see, also, . Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)The LCR aims at increasing the resilience of banks under severe stress over a 3. The LCR is a minimum requirement and, as such, pertains to large internationally active banks on a consolidated basis. The severe stress scenario referred to earlier combines market- wide and idiosyncratic stress including a three notch rating downgrade, the run- off of retail and wholesale deposits, the stagnation of primary and secondary markets (repo, securitization) for many assets, and large cash- outflows due to off- balance sheet items (OBS). The LCR embellishes traditional liquidity . This liquidity standard requires that a bank. Level 2 assets (L2. As) mainly consist of government bonds with a 2. Basel II, covered and nonfinancial corporate bonds (rating at least AA. L2. As are further classified into Level 2. A assets (L2. AAs) and Level 2. B assets (L2. BAs). The latter are subject to higher haircuts and a limit. These include corporate debt securities rated A+ to BBB. However, additional conditions concerning the debt and breadth of the underlying markets, a haircut of at least 1. HQLAs (after haircuts) apply to L2. As. Symbolically this means that. Total nett cash outflow is defined as the total expected cash outflow minus total expected cash inflow for the ensuing 3. While calculating total nett cash outflow, total expected cash inflow is considered up to an aggregate cap of 7. Symbolically, we have. Total expected cash inflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various categories of contractual receivables by the rates at which they are expected to flow in under the stress scenario. In order to prevent banks. This ensures that banks hold a minimum stock of HQLAs equal to 2. Symbolically, we have. NCOF is calculated by applying binding run- off parameters to the contractual outflows of liabilities as well as OBS items and roll- over assumptions to the contractual inflows from assets. Repos in L1. As (0% run- off), stable retail (including SMEs) deposits (3% run- off), and less stable retail deposits (1. Repos with L2. As and with central banks (also in non- LCR- eligible assets) are assigned run- off rates of 1. The latter also applies to operational balances irrespective of the counterparty (but for the part of these balances covered by deposit insurance the CRD IV foresees a 5% run- off rate). Other unsecured wholesale funding from nonfinancial corporates, central banks, and public sector entities (PSEs) receives a 7. Contractual outflows from most other balance sheet positions are assumed to run- off completely as are all OBS items except credit lines granted to nonfinancial corporates, central banks, and public sector entities (1. For some derivatives outflows, national discretion applies. Contractual cash inflows over the 3. No inflows are recognized from operational balances at other banks, receivables from reverse repos in L1. As, and undrawn liquidity lines and similar facilities. Reverse repos in L2. As are treated symmetrically as well, so that 1. Planned inflows from performing retail loans and loans to nonfinancial corporates are capped at 5. Full recognition of contractual inflows is granted to reverse repos in noneligible assets and performing wholesale loans to financial institutions. An example of computing the LCR is given below. As we have seen, two levels of assets can be applied towards the HQLA pool in the numerator of a bank. L1. As include cash, central bank reserves, and debt securities issued or guaranteed by public authorities with a 0% capital risk weight under Basel III. L2. As include debt securities issued by public authorities with a 2. Moreover, L2. As may comprise no more than 4. In other words, the quantity of L2. As included in the HQLA calculation can be at most 2/3 of the quantity of L1. As. In addition, L2. As are subject to a 1. HQLA. All assets included in the calculation must be unencumbered (e. The calibration of scenario run- off rates reflects a combination of the experience during the recent financial crisis, internal stress scenarios of banks and existing regulatory and supervisory standards. From these outflows, banks are permitted to subtract projected inflows for 3. However, the fraction of outflows that can be offset this way is capped at 7.
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